Results explorer

The full record, not the highlights

These tables are generated from the projects' own result files at a fixed commit, so they can't drift from the evidence. Each row's first cell links to the line it was read from. Search, filter or sort as you like.

Agent Eval Platform

From docs/RESULTS.md. Full conversations are graded by the official evaluator; targeted tests use checks fixed in advance on selected cases and are never success rates. Spend marked UB is the usage-based upper bound (every prompt token at full price); “billed” counts cached tokens at the cached rate and became the basis after H005.

Full conversations

S002standard agent, baseline6 × 10 / 6descriptive$0.60 UB
S003standard vs "search before denying" instruction6 × 10 vs 0instruction retired: +45% cost; one unauthorized write in the instruction arm$1.12 UB
H002standard vs harness v1 vs harness v210 × 20 vs 1 vs 0 (of 20)rule (+4) not met. Transfers and denials fell, discovered-tool use rose, passes did not$9.49 UB
H003standard agent, medium reasoning (calibration)5 × 11 / 5settings kept for later runs$0.83 UB
H004harness v1 vs v1 + dependency search10 × 2 (19 complete pairs)2 vs 3INCOMPLETE; gate not met (+1 < +4); write-safety screen failed under the adjudicated reading (violations 8 → 20)$9.86 UB
H005standard vs harness v1, alltoolsstopped earlydescriptive onlystopped: the per-run cap on the upper bound cut off the longer arm. This led to billed accounting$3.49 UB (≈ $1.16 billed)
H008standard vs harness v3.1 (capability search + once-only transfer hold)12 × 2 (22 complete pairs)5 vs 8 (of 22 completed matched pairs)gate not met: +3 < +5; tasks improved minus regressed +1. Write-policy audit (a different subset: every conversation with an executed write, plus both conversations of each pair whose outcomes differ), corrected: 3 violations in 2 standard conversations vs 11 in 7 harness conversations$4.00 billed
H009v3.1 with full vs read-only automatic tool exposure (harness vs harness)12 × 29 vs 6(c) mixed or inconclusive (corrected): fewer violations came with fewer passes$4.24 billed
P001v3.2 vs v3.2 + identity-disclosure check6 × 10 vs 0INCONCLUSIVE_ON_RECOVERY: the check never fired; 0 covered disclosures in either arm$1.26 billed
P004standard vs standard + transfer reason-code re-check30 × 13 vs 3STOP, after a disclosed infrastructure-related rerun amendment; the component was closed$6.01 accounted (billed + $0.38 allowance)

Targeted tests

F001do agent-visible outputs depend on the hidden answer key?yes, in 17 of 30 dev tasks, through one listing tool; a local fix removes it without changing grades. Reported upstream (sierra-research/tau2-bench#574)n/a (benchmark finding)$0
T001does the agent see tools it needs?tool names reached the agent in 17 of 19 conversations; it unlocked a tool in 2led to the adapter and harness (H002+)$0
D001instruction packages at four failure pointsfixed the denial at task_095 (3 of 3), then 2 runs applied an underived $100 creditno (S003)$0.24 UB
D002, D003argument-evidence check; interface instructionscheck barely exercised (one valid credit blocked); no consistent patternnot tested$0.29 UB
A001direct-tool adapter equivalencesame official grade through wrappers and adapter (2 tasks)part of v1–v3.1$0
v1–v3.2 controlsreference solutions of all 30 dev tasks, scriptedsame reward 30 / 30; hard checks fire 0 / 30n/a (safety control)$0
v3 replaycapability search reaches the account-lookup document16 of 90 → 81 of 90 conversations that need it (availability, not use)no: in H008 the lookup tool was called in 6 of 16 where offered$0
D004v3.1 transfer-hold wordingunsupported "transfer under way" claims 26 of 27 → 2 of 27yes for claims: 0 unsupported statements in H008 and H009. No pass gain$0.13 billed
retrospectivedid v1's hold mislead customers?30 unsupported transfer statements in 27 of 84 harness conversations; standard agent 0 in 29led to v3.1$0
D005v3.2 verification hold: what the agent asks nextan eligible field asked in 24 of 30; stored values leaked in 4 of 30 → REVISEled to the disclosure check$0.11 billed
disclosure check (offline)catch identity-value leaks before deliverycatches 4 of 4 D005 leaks; would catch 13 of 1,301 saved agent texts; blind review 23 of 23 agreeP001: never fired (no leak situation arose)$0
P002recovery after the check replaces a known leak6 of 8 selected continuations reached valid verification and resumed worknot tested at scale; work closed$0.63 billed
failure tally, transfer tablewhere failed conversations first go wrong79 failures, 2 blind readers; 68 transfer decisions. Wrong codes mostly without the reason-code documentchose P003's target$0
P003reason-code re-check with vs without doc 04220 of 27 vs 13 of 27 samples; PASS at G1's thresholdno (P004: 3 vs 3)$0.14 billed
confirmation passfresh P004 failures13 of 27 transferred where the reference has none, on 13 tasks; missing required documents recur (absence, not cause)none built (decision: package)$0

Defects found and fixed

1An agent-visible listing depends on the hidden answer keyanswer leakage into 17 of 30 dev tasksF001; upstream issue
2Number provenance matched "100.0" inside "2100.00"an underived amount looks sourcedD001
3"Reference writes" counted lookups made through the wrapperprogress overstated in H002–H004corrected in H004's review
4Per-run cap enforced on the upper boundcut off the longer (harness) arm onlyH005 → billed accounting
5v1's transfer hold led to false "transfer under way" messagesa harness harm the write audits missedD004, retrospective
6Two agent specs could register under one namea later run silently reused the first spec's settingsfixed before any affected run
7"Customer typed matching values" accepted echoes of agent-shown valuesthree invalid verifications counted as validH008/H009 corrected
8Provenance counted an intercepted draft as delivereda valid verification refused (make demo-provenance)before P001
9Execution parser defaulted unknown outcomes to success1 of 565 actions mis-scoredH009 correction
10A per-run cap below one call's reservationevery run stopped at its first callP002 attempt 1 → cap_headroom
11Sequential batches ignored the per-run capone conversation could spend past its intended cap (never past the approved total)fixed after P002
12The harness's fixed verification request confirmed which field matcheda disclosure to unverified customers in 5 of 8P002 → neutral request
13"Code graded" included task_035 (any code passes) and task_092 (database-graded)wrong denominators in two analysesfailure tally; P004 plan

Spend

S001–D003 (phase 1)upper bound$2.26
H002–H005upper bound$23.67 (H005 ≈ $1.16 billed)
D004–P004billed$16.14
P004's two operator-stopped conversationsconservatively accounted (unresolved calls at full reservation)$0.38

Post-Training Lab

The retry ladder from docs/LAB_NOTEBOOK.md: how much training adds as the verifier-guided scaffold gets more tries.

Retry ladder

126.3%+21.3
344.7%+14.3
553.0%+9.6
10 (Stage A)62.2%+3.7
~14–18 (+repair)65.2%+2.5

Code-review LoRA

From docs/RESULTS.md: SFT v4 against the base model and the earlier v3, 200-sample in-distribution eval.

SFT v4 vs base

Pairwise win vs base—71.5%86.0% CI [81.5%, 91%]
Haiku absolute mean (0–10)4.334.25 (regressed)5.86
Pass@1 ≥ 77%14.5%46.0%
Pass@1 ≥ 8 (strict)2%—24.5%
Hallucination rate14.5%34.5% (3× worse)7.0% (halved vs base)
Issue detection96.5%94.5%92.0%
ROUGE-L vs expert reference0.099—0.180
Failure-pattern tests (9 patterns × 3)9/2727/2727/27
Prompt-eng gauntlet (v4 vs few-shot CoT)——v4 wins 82.5%